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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2007, Brian Albertson pled guilty to a single count of possession of a controlled
substance and was granted a withheld judgment.  Over the next three years, Mr. Albertson
satisfied all of the conditions of his probation, including completing drug court.  In 2010, he
moved to withdraw his guilty plea and have his case dismissed.  The State assented to
Mr.  Albertson’s  request,  and  the  district  court  granted  the  motion  and  entered  an  order
dismissing the case.
More recently, in 2016, Mr. Albertson filed a pro se motion pursuant to Idaho Court
Administrative Rule 32 seeking to have his case sealed.  He pointed out that since his case was
dismissed he had remained law-abiding, become the father of three children, and obtained a
master’s degree, but felt he was disqualified from many jobs based on his having been previously
convicted of a felony.  At a hearing on Mr. Albertson’s motion, the State had no objection,
expressing  that  Mr.  Albertson  should  get  relief  so  long  as  it  was  in  the  court’s  power  to  grant
such  relief.   Nevertheless,  while  the  district  court  recognized  it  had  the  authority  to  seal
Mr. Albertson’s case, it declined to do so.
On appeal, Mr. Albertson contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion under Rule 32.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April 2007, Brian Albertson was charged with two counts of possession of
methamphetamine (one count for methamphetamine found in the center console of his car and
one count for methamphetamine found on his person) and misdemeanor counts of possession of
2marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.27-29.)  Mr. Albertson waived his
preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court.  (R., pp.30-31, 33.)
Within three weeks of having been arrested, Mr. Albertson entered into a plea agreement,
pursuant to which he pled guilty to a single count of possession of methamphetamine and, in
exchange, the State dismissed the other counts and recommended probation.  (See R., pp.38-40,
72.)  At sentencing, the district court withheld judgment and placed Mr. Albertson on probation
for  three  years,  (R.,  pp.47-48,  49-70.)   Apparently,  as  a  condition  of  probation,  Mr.  Albertson
was required to complete drug court.  (See R., pp.75-76.)
At  the  conclusion  of  his  three-year  period  of  probation,  Mr.  Albertson  filed  a  motion
seeking to withdraw his previous guilty plea and have his case dismissed.  (R., pp.75-76.)  In
support of that motion, he alleged that he had complied with all of the requirements and
conditions of probation, including successful completion of drug court and paying all of his fines
and fees.  (R., pp.75-76.)  At a hearing on that motion, the State indicated it had no objection to
Mr. Albertson’s guilty plea being withdrawn and his case dismissed.  (R., pp.82-83.)  Thereafter,
the district court granted Mr. Albertson’s motion.  (R., pp.82-83.)  A formal dismissal order was
entered on October 22, 2010.  (R., p.84.)
Nearly six years later, Mr. Albertson, acting pro se, filed a motion pursuant to Idaho
Court Administrative Rule 32 seeking to have his case sealed.  (R., pp.86-87.)  In his written
motion,  Mr.  Albertson  averred  that  he  had  obtained  a  Master’s  Degree  in  Public  Health  Care
Policy and he had not been convicted of any new crimes (felony or misdemeanor), and he
explained that he was seeking a job in his new field, but was concerned that “the information
contained in the Idaho repository may inhibit my ability to find a job in my field.”  (R., p.86.)  At
3a subsequent hearing on his motion,1 Mr. Albertson revealed that, in addition to having furthered
his education, he had had three children.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.15-16.)  He also elaborated on his
argument concerning his difficulty finding work, explaining as follows:
I’m getting to the point where I’m applying for positions, and it gets to the point
where  I’m—“Have you been  convicted  of  a  felony?”   If  I  put  yes,  even  though
you’re not automatically disqualified, it’s automatically disqualifying.  If I put no
and they pulled my records, it shows that I was convicted of a felony[2] ….
(Tr., p.5, Ls.18-24.)
The district court denied Mr. Albertson’s motion.  (Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.9, L.8; R., p.91.)  It
lamented the fact that Idaho lacks a true expungement mechanism; it indicated that “if there was
anyone who ever appeared before me who deserved [expungement], it would be you”; and it
even  apologized  to  Mr.  Albertson  for  denying  his  motion.   (Tr.,  p.8,  L.22  –  p.9,  L.8.)   But  it
ultimately concluded that Mr. Albertson failed to meet his burden, under Rule 32(i)(3),3 to show
that the harm to his economic or financial interests attendant to his case being available to the
1 At the hearing, Mr. Albertson was represented by counsel, but still addressed the court directly.
(See generally Tr.)
2 Pursuant to United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403 (2008), entry of a guilty plea is a
“conviction” under Idaho law.  Thus, depending on how a job application question is worded, in
order to answer truthfully Mr. Albertson may have to disclose his past “conviction” in this case
even though his guilty plea was withdrawn and the case was dismissed.  For example,  if  a job
application asked, “Have you previously been convicted of a felony,” the truthful response would
probably be “yes.”
Adding to Mr. Albertson’s challenges, it appears that even though his case was ordered
dismissed in 2010, for years thereafter, the Idaho Repository failed to reflect that dismissal and
still indicated that he had a withheld judgment.  (See Tr., p.9, L.9 – p.10, L.17.)  Thus, even if
Mr. Albertson indicated on a job application that he did not have a current felony conviction, his
disclosure would have appeared to a potential employer to be false.
3 Rule 32 was amended multiple times in 2016.  It appears that the district court was working off
the version of the Rule that existed prior to July 1, 2016.  Although the relevant portions of the
Rule are substantively unchanged, since July 1, 2016, the relevant language has been codified at
I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2)(C).
Under Rule 32(i)(2)(C),  a court  has the discretion to seal or redact court  records where
they “contain facts or statements, the dissemination or publication of which may compromise the
financial security of, or could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to a person
having an interest in the documents or materials ….”
4public, outweighed the public’s interest in knowing about his case.  (Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.7, L.23,
p.8,  Ls.8-16,  p.9,  Ls.3-8.)   Critical  to  this  conclusion  was  the  court’s  observation  that
Mr. Albertson did not offer any evidence that he “has been denied employment based upon the
information in the repository,” and, instead, merely “speculates that that could happen.”
(Tr., p.8, Ls.8-16.)
Following entry of a written order denying Mr. Albertson’s motion (see R., p.91),
Mr. Albertson filed a timely notice of appeal (R., pp.93-95).  On appeal, Mr. Albertson contends
the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion.  Specifically, he contends that
because the relevant court rule only required a showing that his financial security “may” be
compromised, or that he “could” suffer economic or financial loss or harm, I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2)(C)
(emphasis  added),  he  was  not  required  to  show that  he  had  actually  already  been  denied  a  job
based on information concerning his case being available to the public.
5ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Albertson’s motion to seal his criminal
case?
6ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Albertson’s Motion to Seal His
Criminal Case
A. Introduction
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Albertson’s motion—made
pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i)(2(C)—to seal the record.  Specifically, the
district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with the applicable legal
standard.
B. Applicable Legal Standards
In State v. Turpen, the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a defendant’s request to have
his case “expunged” is properly made pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 32(i).  147
Idaho 869, 871 (2009).4  This Rule provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(i) Other Prohibitions or Limitations on Disclosure and Motions Regarding
the Sealing of Records.  Physical  and  electronic  records,  may  be  disclosed,  or
temporarily or permanently sealed or redacted by order of the court on a case-by-
case basis.
(1) Any person or the court on its own motion may move to disclose, redact, seal
or unseal a part or all of the records in any judicial proceeding.  The court shall
hold a hearing on the motion ….  The court may order that the record immediately
be redacted or sealed pending the hearing if the court finds that doing so may be
necessary to prevent harm to any person or persons.  In ruling on whether specific
records should be disclosed, redacted or sealed by order of the court, the court
shall determine and make a finding of fact as to whether the interest in privacy or
public disclosure predominates.  If the court redacts or seals records to protect
predominating privacy interests, it must fashion the least restrictive exception
from disclosure consistent with privacy interests.
4 The Turpen Court did not use the term “expungement” literally, in the sense that court records
could be destroyed at the request of the defendant; rather, the Court used it to “mean the issuance
of a court order requiring physical or electronic sequestration of such record from public access
or inspection.” Turpen, 147 Idaho at 870-71.  Further, the Court of Appeals has subsequently
explained that relief under Rule 32(i) does not render the sealed proceedings a nullity (as if they
had never occurred), only that the records of those proceedings are protected from disclosure.
See State v. Doe, 155 Idaho 99, 106 (Ct. App. 2013).
7(2)  Before  a  court  may enter  an  order  redacting  or  sealing  records,  it  must  also
make one or more of the following determinations in writing:
(A) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or
statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a
reasonable person, or
(B) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the
court finds might be libelous, or
(C)  That  the  documents  or  materials  contain  facts  or  statements,  the
dissemination or publication of which may compromise the financial
security  of,  or  could  reasonably  result  in  economic  or  financial  loss  or
harm  to,  a  person  having  an  interest  in  the  documents  or  materials,  or
compromise the security of personnel, records or public property of or
used by the judicial department, or
(D) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might
threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals, or
(E) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the documents or
materials to preserve the right to a fair trial, or
(F) That the documents contain personal data identifiers that should have
been redacted pursuant to Rule 2.6 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
in which case the court shall order that the documents be redacted in a
manner consistent with the provisions of that rule.
(3) In applying these rules, the court is referred to the traditional legal concepts in
the law of the right to a fair trial, invasion of privacy, defamation, and invasion of
proprietary business records as well as common sense respect for shielding highly
intimate or financially sensitive material about persons.
(4) When a record is sealed under this rule, it shall not be subject to examination,
inspection or copying by the public. When the court issues an order sealing or
redacting  records,  the  court  shall  also  inform  the  Clerk  of  the  District  Court  of
which  specific  files,  documents  and  case  management  system  records  are  to  be
sealed or redacted. When the court issues an order sealing or redacting records for
purposes  of  public  disclosure,  the  original  records  in  the  court  file  shall  not  be
altered in any fashion.
I.C.A.R. 32(i).  Thus, under this Rule, in order for there to be an order to redacting or sealing the
record (or a portion thereof), the trial court must:  (1) find that the information to be redacted or
8sealed implicates at least one of the six privacy concerns enumerated in Rule 32(i)(2)(A) – (F)5;
and (2) balancing the movant’s privacy interest against the public’s interest in disclosure, the
movant’s interest in privacy predominates.6  And,  if  such  an  order  is  entered,  the  court  “must
fashion the least restrictive exception from disclosure consistent with privacy interests.”
I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1).
A decision of a district court not to redact or seal the record under Rule 32(i) is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 503 (2012).  An abuse of discretion
will  be  found if:   (1)  the  district  court  failed  to  correctly  perceive  that  it  had  discretion;  (2)  it
failed  to  act  within  the  boundaries  of  its  discretion  and  consistently  with  applicable  legal
standards; or (3) it failed exercise reason in reaching its decision. Id.
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Albertson’s Motion To Seal His
Criminal Case
Mr.  Albertson  contends  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  denied  his  Rule
32(i)  motion  to  seal  his  criminal  case.   Specifically,  the  district  court  failed  to  act  consistently
with the applicable legal standard in denying his motion.  In evaluating Mr. Albertson’s personal
privacy interest in light of Rule 32(i)(2)(C), it held Mr. Albertson to a standard of having to
produce evidence of actual financial loss or economic harm, i.e., an actual lost employment
opportunity, owing to the record in his case being available to the public.  However, under this
Rule he was only required to show that the information contained in the record, and left open to
the public, “may compromise [his] financial security” or it “could reasonably result in economic
or financial loss or harm.”  I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
5 I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2).  In this case, the only privacy concern of Rule 32(i)(2) that is at issue is that
which is set forth in Rule 32(i)(2)(C), i.e., that the dissemination of the information in the record
“may compromise the financial security of, or could reasonably result in economic or financial
loss or harm to,” Mr. Albertson.
9In support of his Rule 32(i) motion, Mr. Albertson alleged, inter alia, that he had recently
obtained a Master’s Degree in Public Health Care Policy and was seeking a job in his new field,
but was concerned that “the information contained in the Idaho repository may inhibit my ability
to find a job in my field.”  (R., p.86.)  He went on to explain as follows:
I’m getting to the point where I’m applying for positions, and it gets to the point
where  I’m—“Have you been  convicted  of  a  felony?”   If  I  put  yes,  even  though
you’re not automatically disqualified, it’s automatically disqualifying.  If I put no
and they pulled my records, it shows that I was convicted of a felony ….
(Tr., p.5, Ls.18-24.)
As the district court correctly recognized (see Tr., p.7, Ls.5-23), Mr. Albertson’s motion
invoked the basis for sealing records that is set forth in Rule 32(i)(2)(C)—where the record
“contain facts or statements, the dissemination or publication of which may compromise the
financial security of, or could reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to, a person
having  an  interest  in  the  documents  or  materials  ….”   It  is  now well-established  that  a  loss  of
employment opportunities, as Mr. Albertson alleged here, may qualify someone for relief under
Rule 32(i)(2)(C).  In Doe v. State, the State had argued that a loss of employment opportunities
attendant to a criminal conviction cannot satisfy the “financial security” or “economic or
financial loss or harm” standard of Rule 32(i)(2)(C), but the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected the
State’s contention.  153 Idaho 685, 689-90 (Ct. App. 2012).
The district court seems to have recognized that a loss of employment opportunities could
form a basis for relief under Rule 32(i)(2)(C); however, in evaluating whether Mr. Albertson met
his burden under that subsection of Rule 32, the district court apparently concluded that he failed
to satisfy the standard:  “I don’t have any evidence before me at this time that Mr. Albertson has
been denied employment based on the information in the repository.  The motion speculates that
6 I.C.A.R. 32(i)(1); State v. Gurney, 152 Idaho 502, 504-05 (2012).
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could happen.”  (Tr., p.8, Ls.8-12.)  Thus, the district court appears to have reasoned, in part, that
because Mr. Albertson failed to prove he was actually denied employment, he failed to make an
adequate showing under Rule 32(i)(2)(C).  However, under that Rule, he was not required to
show he had actually suffered economic harm owing to his criminal case being open to the
public.  He was only required to show that such economic harm was possible.  As quoted above,
Rule 32(i)(2)(C) calls for an inquiry into whether public dissemination of the information at issue
“may compromise [the movant’s] financial security” or whether it “could reasonably result in
economic or financial loss or harm” to the movant.  I.C.A.R. 32(i)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
By holding Mr. Albertson to a standard of showing actual financial or economic harm, as
opposed to the mere possibility of such harm, the district court applied a more stringent standard
than that called for under Rule 32(i)(2)(C).  Thus, the district court failed to act consistently with
the applicable legal standard and, therefore, abused its discretion.
Further, this abuse of discretion tainted the district court’s ultimate decision to deny
Mr. Albertson’s motion.  Having applied an erroneous standard to its evaluation of
Mr. Albertson’s personal interest in the privacy of his criminal record, the district court was in no
position to take the next step in its analysis and balance Mr. Albertson’s privacy interest against
the State’s interest in disclosure.
11
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Albertson respectfully requests that the order denying the
motion to seal his case be vacated, and that his case be remanded to the district court for
consideration of his motion under the proper standard.
DATED this 8th day of June, 2017.
________/s/_________________
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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